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Abstract 
 
For decades, earnings from farming in many low-income countries have been depressed by a 
pro-urban bias in own-country policies, as well as by governments of richer countries favoring 
their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. Both sets of policies reduce national and global 
economic growth. They also add to inequality and poverty in developing countries, since most of 
the world’s billion poorest people depend on farming for their livelihood. Over the past two 
decades numerous developing country governments have reduced their sectoral and trade policy 
distortions, while some high-income countries also have begun reforming their protectionist 
policies. Drawing on results from a new multi-country research project, this paper examines the 
extent of South Africa’s reforms relative to those of other temperate-zone Southern Hemisphere 
countries, of Northern Hemisphere rich countries, and of other developing countries. It concludes 
by pointing to the scope and prospects for further pro-poor policy reform at home and abroad. 
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Distortions to farmer prices since the 1950s:  
South Africa in international perspective 
 
Kym Anderson, Francesca de Nicola, Esteban Jara,  






In 2005 the OECD Secretariat published the first set of producer support estimates and 
consumer subsidy equivalents (PSEs and CSEs) for agricultural products in South Africa, 
for the period beginning in 1994, and they have since updated them to 2005 (OECD 
2006, 2007). That has contributed substantially to policy transparency in South Africa, 
and has allowed comparisons of the extent of food and agricultural market intervention to 
be made between South Africa and a few other large developing economies as well as 
with the richer OECD countries. 
This paper seeks to add to that major contribution in two ways. First, it 
summarizes a forthcoming report by Kirsten, Edwards and Vink (2007) that builds on the 
OECD’s work to (a) extend the measurement of agricultural distortions in South Africa 
back to 1961, expressed as nominal rates of assistance (NRAs) and consumer tax 
equivalents (CTEs), and (b) compare those NRAs for primary agriculture with those for 
non-agricultural tradable sectors, so as to generate a relative rate of assistance (RRA) to 
farmers. This is important because even when the NRA for agriculture is positive, value 
added in agriculture nonetheless could be harmed by government policies if the NRA for 
other tradables is higher than that for farmers. 
Second, the present paper compares the NRA and RRA trends for South Africa 
with those of other temperate-zone Southern Hemisphere countries, of Northern 
Hemisphere rich countries, and of other developing countries since the late 1950s/early 
1960s. This is now possible because the Kirsten, Edwards and Vink (2007) study is part 
of a large World Bank research project aimed at generating such estimates for more than  2
70 countries that together account for about 90 percent of global agriculture and GDP. 
For decades, earnings from farming in many developing countries have been depressed 
by a pro-urban bias in own-country policies as well as by governments of richer countries 
favoring their farmers with import barriers and subsidies. Because both sets of policies 
reduce national and global economic growth and add to inequality and poverty in 
developing countries, there has been pressure over the past two decades on governments 
to reduce their sectoral and trade policy distortions. The new NRA and RRA estimates 
reported in this paper allow us to assess the extent to which that pressure for reform has 
been successful in other countries compared with South Africa. 
The paper begins by outlining the methodology adopted by authors of the South 
African and other country case studies in the World Bank project. It then provides, by 
way of background, a brief synopsis of key features of the other four major temperate-
zone Southern Hemisphere economies (Argentina, Australia, Chile and New Zealand) 
whose NRA and RRA trends are to be compared with South Africa’s. Those distortions 
estimates are then presented, along with those of Northern Hemisphere rich countries and 
of other developing countries. The paper concludes by pointing to the scope and 
prospects for further reductions in distortions to agricultural incentives that could 
improve the performance of South Africa’s agricultural economy. 
 
Methodology for measuring Nominal and Relative Rates of Assistance 
 
The NRA is defined as the percentage by which government policies have raised gross 
returns to producers above what they would be without the government’s intervention (or 
lowered them, if NRA<0). There are several purposes for which NRAs can be used, and 
they affect the choice of methodology. The World Bank project seeks to achieve three 
purposes. One is to generate a comparable set of number across a wide range of countries 
and over a long (half-century) time period, so the methodology needs to be both simple 
and somewhat flexible. Another purpose is to provide a single number to indicate the 
total net extent of transfer to (or from) farmers due to agricultural policies and another for 
the extent of transfer to (or from) consumers. This is what the OECD’s PSE and CSE do,  3
both of which can be negative when transfers from exceed transfers to the relevant group. 
The World Bank project’s NRA and CTE are similar to the OECD’s but with some 
important differences outlined below. And the third purpose is to be able to use the NRAs 
for individual primary and lightly processed agricultural products as producer price 
wedges, and the CTEs as consumer price wedges, in single-sector, multi-sector and 
economy-wide policy simulation models by allocating those wedges to particular policy 
instruments such as trade taxes or domestic subsidies. 
  The NRAs are based on estimates of assistance to individual industries. Great care 
has gone into generating the NRA for each covered industry, particularly in developing 
countries where trade costs are high, pass-through along the value chain is affected by 
imperfect competition, and markets for foreign currency have been highly distorted at 
various times and to varying degrees in the past. Space limitations prevent all 
methodological details being provided here, but key points are mentioned below and 
further details can be found in Anderson et al. (2006) and Anderson (2008, Appendix). 
Most distortions to industries producing tradables come from trade measures, such 
as a tariff imposed on the cif import price or an export subsidy imposed on the fob price 
at the country’s border. Since an ad valorem tariff or export subsidy is the equivalent of a 
production subsidy and a consumption tax expressed as a percentage of the border price, 
that is what is captured in the NRA and CTE at the point in the value chain at which the 
product is traded. To get the NRA for the farmer, consultants estimated or guessed the 
extent of pass-through back to the farm gate, and likewise in going forward to the 
consumer at the retail level. These aspects among others differentiate the World Bank’s 
measures from the OECD’s, since the PSE is expressed as a percentage of the distorted 
price (hence will be lower than the NRA which is expressed as a percentage of the 
undistorted price) and both the PSE and CSE are measured at the farm-gate level whereas 
the World Bank’s NRAs are provided at both the farmer and processor levels. To 
simplify the presentation, in what follows we focus just on the NRA at the primary 
producer (farmer) level. 
  The World Bank project decided against seeking estimates of the more complex 
effective rate of assistance (ERA) even though it is, in principle, a better partial  4
equilibrium single measure of distortions to producer incentives than the nominal rate 
(Balassa 1971, Corden 1971). The ERA shows how value added rather than the gross 
value of production is affected, thereby taking into account differences across industries 
in the value added share of output as well as distortions to intermediate input prices. The 
advantage of the NRA over the ERA measure, however, is that the coverage could be 
much wider given the budget limitation and lack of input data and input-output tables in 
many developing countries for our half-century time series. Moreover, unlike a 
generation ago, there are now many national and even global economy-wide computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models that in principle can estimate the impact on value 
added for an industry of a complex set of input and output price distortions, and in any 
case require as parameters the separate nominal rates affecting both outputs and 
intermediate inputs. In practice farm input subsidies/taxes have, on average, a tiny overall 
impact on value added compared with output price distortions. Hence, for this project, 
consultants ignored trivial input distortions, but they were asked to capture any 
significant product-specific input price distortions by estimating their equivalence in 
terms of a higher output price and including that in the NRA for individual agricultural 
industries wherever data allow. They were also required to add non-product-specific 
distortions into the estimate for the overall sectoral NRA for agriculture as a whole. 
  The targeted degree of coverage of products for which NRA estimates are 
generated was 70 percent (the same as for the OECD’s PSE coverage), based on the gross 
value of production at undistorted prices. In countries such as Chile, with many different 
horticultural products, the coverage ratio was smaller, while for some others it exceeded 
85 percent. Unlike the OECD, this project did not assume the nominal assistance for non-
covered products is the same as the average for covered products. This is because in 
developing countries at least, policies affecting the non-covered products are often very 
different from those for covered products. The nontradables among them, for example, 
are often low-quality food staples that are subject to no direct distortionary policies. The 
World Bank project therefore asked authors of the country case studies to provide three 
sets of ‘guesstimates’ of the NRAs for non-covered products, one each for the import-
competing, exportable and nontradable sub-sectors. A weighted average for all 
agricultural products was then generated, using the values of production at unassisted  5
prices as weights. For countries that also provide non-product-specific subsidies or taxes 
(assumed to be shared on a pro-rata basis between tradables and nontradables), they are 
then added to get a NRA for total agriculture (and for tradable agriculture, for use in 
generating the Relative Rate of Assistance, defined below).   
During the past two decades there has been a tendency in some high-income 
countries to move away from trade measures to more-direct forms of assistance to 
farmers. This is largely in response to domestic pressures to improve policy efficiency, 
and to pressures from abroad during and following the GATT’s multilateral trade 
negotiations that resulted in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture aimed at 
reducing trade distortions. Some of those new measures are more decoupled from 
production incentives than others, so their production and trade effects have not entirely 
disappeared. And they still bestow a transfer to farmers. Hence we show the NRA both 
with and without those ‘decoupled’ measures for those (mostly high-income) countries 
adopting them, thereby allowing the reader to impose their own view as to how 
decoupled these payments are in practice.  
How best to present regional aggregate NRA and RRA estimates depends on the 
purpose for which the averages are required. If one is interested in the question of how 
distorted is overall high-income or developing country or global agriculture, the average 
for our sample countries in the relevant group is weighted using the undistorted value of 
agricultural production in each of those countries as weights. If one is interested in each 
polity as a separate observation for the purposes of cross-country political economy 
analysis, then a simple (unweighted) average across countries is more appropriate. The 
latter is in effect what is provided when reporting simple or multiple regression equations 
using a subset or full sample of our project’s countries (as in Figures 9 and 10 below), but 
for most of the rest of this paper we report weighted averages.  
Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own outputs but also, albeit 
indirectly via factor market prices, by the incentives nonagricultural producers face. That 
is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government assistance that affect 
producer incentives. More than seventy years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry 
Theorem that proved that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect on  6
the export sector as an export tax. This carries over to a model that also includes a third 
sector producing only nontradables, to a model with imperfect competition, and 
regardless of the economy’s size (Vousden 1990, pp. 46-47). The reason the result carries 
over with nontradables is that if an import tax of rate t is replaced by an export tax at rate 
t, all traded goods prices are reduced by 1/(1+ t) and therefore the price of all 
nontradables has to also change by that same amount if the market for nontradables (in 
which the quantity supplied domestically has to equal the quantity demanded) is to 
remain in equilibrium. Thus if one can assume there are no distortions in the markets for 
nontradables, the overall distortion to agricultural incentives can be captured by the 
extent to which the tradable parts of agricultural production are assisted or taxed relative 
to producers of other tradables. By generating estimates of the average NRA for non-




t/100) – 1] 
where NRAag
t and NRAnonag
t are the weighted average percentage NRAs for the 
tradable parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. Since the 
NRA cannot be less than -100 percent if producers are to earn anything, neither can the 
RRA. This measure is useful in that if it is below zero, it provides an internationally 
comparable indication of the extent to which a country’s policy regime has an anti-
agricultural bias, and conversely when the RRA is positive. 
  The cost of government policy distortions to incentives in terms of resource 
misallocation are greater the greater the degree of substitution in production (Lloyd 
1974). In the case of agriculture which involves the use of farm land that is sector-
specific but transferable among farm activities, the greater the variation of NRAs across 
industries within the sector then the higher will be the welfare cost of those market 
interventions. A simple indicator of that cost is the standard deviation of industry NRAs 
within agriculture. Therefore we report not only the weighted mean NRA for the 
industries covered within the sector (again using the values of production at unassisted 
prices as weights), but also the standard deviation around that mean each year. 
  Each industry is classified either as import-competing, or a producer of 
exportables, or as producing a non-tradable (with its status sometimes changing over the  7
years), so that it is possible to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for the 
two different groups of tradables. Those NRAs are used to generate a trade bias index, 
TBI, defined as: 
TBI = 100[(1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1] 
where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing 
and exportables parts of the agricultural sector. The TBI indicates in a single number the 
extent to which the strong anti-trade bias (negative TBI) in agricultural policies of the 
past (see, e.g., Krueger, Schiff and Valdes 1988) has changed in more-recent decades. 
  Before turning to the NRA and RRA estimates themselves, it is helpful to briefly 
review some pertinent characteristics of the economies of South Africa and other 
(especially Southern Hemisphere) countries to be compared with it, to anticipate what 
differences to expect simply from those characteristics.    
  
Key features of temperate-zone Southern Hemisphere economies 
 
South Africa is one of only a few temperate-zone agricultural economies in the Southern 
Hemisphere, the key other ones being Argentina, Australia, Chile and New Zealand. As a 
group they are well endowed with agricultural land per capita relative to the other large 
BRICS economies (Brazil, China, India, and Russia), the high-income countries of the 
Northern Hemisphere, and the world as a whole (first column of Table 1). But except for 
Chile, South Africa is the least well endowed among those five Southern Hemisphere 
economies which, given also its mineral wealth, would lead one to expect South Africa to 
have the weakest comparative advantage in agriculture among those five, cet. par. It also 
has the lowest income per capita among those five, being one-third below that of 
Argentina and Chile (middle column of Table 1). Agricultural comparative advantage 
tends to be negatively correlated with per capita income, so that would have the opposite 
influence of land endowment on the country’s trade. However, that is evidently not strong 
enough to prevent South Africa having the lowest share of exports from agriculture and 
food among those five temperate-zone Southern Hemisphere countries: its share is only 
30 percent above the global average and less than one-fifth above that for Western 
Europe and North America (final column of Table 1).   8
Agriculture’s share of exports was much higher for South Africa three decades 
ago, but so too were agriculture’s shares of its GDP and employment. Indeed South 
Africa is remarkable in now having only the same small share of employment in 
agriculture as Australia (final column of Table 2), even though, as is clear from Table 1, 
Australia is seven times more affluent. Its weak comparative advantage in farm products 
is also reflected in the estimate in Table 3 suggesting only about one-eighth of the value 
of South African farm production is exported on average, compared with three to six 
times that share for the other temperate-zone Southern Hemisphere countries. 
  Previous studies of the political economy of agricultural distortions find that 
countries tend to assist farmers more the weaker their agricultural comparative advantage 
and the higher their per capita income (Anderson and Hayami 1986; Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes 1988; Lindert 1991; de Gorter and Swinnen 2002). This would lead one to not be 
surprised if South Africa was found to be protective of its farmers. Its import tariffs on 
both agricultural and other products currently are higher than those in Australasia and 
Chile, though not than those in Argentina (Table 4). That has been true since at least the 
1950s, according to data on the average rate of customs revenue collection (Figure 1). 
Yet South Africa appears to be relatively open according to data on the value of trade as a 
percentage of GDP (Figure 2). Hence the need for comprehensive NRA estimates based 
on price comparisons to get a more-precise sense of its distortions to agricultural 
incentives relative to other those of other countries. 
 
Summary of estimates of Nominal and Relative Rates of Assistance 
 
Table 5 summarizes the Kirsten, Edwards and Vink (2007) estimates of NRAs for the 70 per 
cent or so of agriculture for which they were able to get prices from the early 1960s. 
During the 1960s and 1970s the weighted average NRA was slightly negative but only to 
the extent of about 6 percent on average. In the 1980s it switched to being positive (at an 
average rate of about 15 percent), but it dropped back in the 1990s to 4 percent and, in the 
current decade, has been close to zero on average (final column of Table 5). Most of the 
sector is import-competing rather than producing for export, but it is not those industries’  9
NRAs but rather those for exportables that has contributed most to the fluctuations in the 
average NRA for the sector as a whole over this long period (bottom of Table 6). 
  Table 6 also provides comparable NRA estimates for the other temperate-zone 
Southern Hemisphere countries. South Africa’s NRA pattern over those 45 years is not 
very different from New Zealand’s and Chile’s on average, although its standard 
deviation across the covered products is somewhat greater. Australia also had a period of 
rising assistance to farmers, but its peaked earlier and at a lower average than did South 
Africa’s and again its standard deviation in recent decades has been well below that of 
South Africa’s. It is Argentina that differs from the rest of the Southern Hemisphere 
group, with its high agricultural export taxes that were reduced in the 1990s but re-
introduced in late 2001. This shows up clearly in Figure 3.  
At the other extreme to Argentina are the high-income temperate-zone countries 
of the Northern Hemisphere, whose NRAs are a long way above those of South Africa 
and the other temperate-zone Southern Hemisphere countries (c.f. Figures 3 and 4).  
By contrast, the patterns for other developing countries, shown in Figure 5, are 
mixed. Consider first the weighted averages shown in Figure 5(a), which give a sense of 
overall direct agricultural distortions in each continent. For Africa (excluding South 
Africa), the NRA weighted average has fluctuated around -10 percent, and shown a slight 
upward trend. The Latin American weighted average is a little higher (less negative) and 
with more upward trend over the 5 decades such that its average NRA for agriculture has 
been positive for the past two decades. The Asian weighted average NRA for farmers has 
shown an even steeper upward trend, coming from a very low level in the 1950s and 
1960s and becoming positive from the 1990s.
1 
                                                 
1 The Asian line in Figure 5 is broken for earlier years because it includes an assumption about the NRAs 
for China and India, whose NRA estimates go back only to 1981 and 1965, respectively. Since their 
weights are so large in the Asian and developing country averages, and their rates of taxation so much 
greater than for other Asian countries in prior years, we have made conservative guesstimates for them as 
follows. First, we assume these countries' shares of global unassisted value of agricultural production are 
the same for prior years (pre-1981 for China and pre-1965 for India) as averaged in 1981-89 for China and 
in 1965-74 for India. (The FAO archives website shows that India's share of global cereals production has 
been steady at around 12 percent throughout the past four decades, and China's has grown only slightly 
after the Great Leap Forward, from 20 to 23 percent.) Second, we assume also that their NRAs and RRAs 
are the same for prior years as averaged in 1981-89 for China (NRA = -40 percent, RRA = -55 percent) and 
in 1965-74 for India (NRA = -0.1 percent, RRA = -52 percent). This is conservative because, if anything, 
agriculture was discouraged even more by an import-substituting industrialization strategy in those prior 
years than in the decade following.  10
When simple rather than weighted averages are used, large economies, such as 
Nigeria and Egypt in Africa or China and India in Asia, have less influence on the 
regional average. The simple average is more important for political economy analysis, 
since it treats each country as an equally interesting polity. Figure 5(b) shows that 
countries in Africa had close to zero agricultural NRAs on average around the time most 
of them achieved independence in the late 1950s/early 1960s. The first two decades of 
independence were characterized by increasing taxation of farmers, and then in the most 
recent 25 years there has been a nearly complete reversal of that previous trend. 
So South Africa is, along with Australia and New Zealand, a bit unusual in having 
a relatively flat trend in its NRA for agriculture over this long period, with some 
indulgence in support for farmers in the middle of the period but close to none now 
(whereas Chile and Argentina have been converging towards zero NRA for agriculture – 
Chile from high nominal protection and Argentina from high taxation – but neither has 
quite got to zero yet). 
To get a more-complete picture of distortions to agricultural incentives, we need 
to take into account also assistance to non-agricultural tradable sectors by turning to 
weighted average estimates of the RRA. Ignoring Argentina (for which agriculture 
appears even more heavily taxed once non-agricultural distortions are taken into 
account), the estimates for South Africa differs somewhat more from the other Southern 
Hemisphere temperate-zone countries in terms of the RRA than in terms of the NRA. 
Specifically, for Australia in the 1945-54 period (not shown but see Anderson, Lattimore, 
Lloyd and MacLaren 2007), and for Chile and New Zealand in the period to 1970, their 
RRAs each averaged worse than -20 percent whereas South Africa’s averaged only -4 
percent in the 1960s (Figure 6). Subsequently, the RRAs for those other three countries 
have all converged steadily to zero, whereas the RRA for South Africa became positive in 
the 1980s but has since become negative again. Table 7 shows that this is mostly because 
of fluctuations in the NRA for tradable agriculture. But that table also exposes the need 
for an important caveat: for South Africa the NRA estimates for tradable manufactures 
are nothing more than customs receipts divided by imports of manufactures. Insofar as 
South Africa also had nontariff import barriers in the past, especially prior to the 1990s, 
the country authors may be grossly underestimating the earlier NRAs for non-agricultural  11
tradables (while capturing them for agriculture via the direct price comparison 
methodology). 
  
Prospects for further reform in South Africa and elsewhere 
 
By international standards, the above estimates suggest South Africa has had relatively 
little in the way of distortions to agricultural incentives on average over the past 45 years. 
That is not to say there has been little intervention by governments in the country’s 
agricultural markets. Kirsten, Edwards and Vink (2007) and Karaan (2007) point to 
myriad ways in which the state has intervened through a whole host of marketing 
programs, possibly stifling rural entrepeneurship in the process. Nor is it to say that there 
is no scope for improving resource allocation within the agricultural sector. On the 
contrary, Table 6 reveals that, notwithstanding the considerable reforms undertaken since 
the new government and the signing of the Uruguay Round Agreements in 1994, the 
standard deviation of NRAs among South Africa’s farm industries is still comparatively 
high, a reduction of which would encourage more farm resources to move to industries in 
which the country was most competitive internationally. The experiences of both 
Australia and New Zealand in doing just that over the past twenty years suggest 
considerable benefits can follow from such reform in terms of increased productivity 
growth in agriculture (see Figure 7). 
What about over the longer term? The upward trend in nominal assistance to 
agriculture over the past half century for developing countries, as reported in Figure 5, is 
also revealed in simple regression equations using our pooled time series and cross-
country estimates with NRA or RAA as the endogenous variable and real per capita 
income as the exogenous variable. Also, cross-country multiple regression for the most 
recent period (2000-04) confirms that countries with not only a higher per capita income 
but also a lower comparative advantage in agricultural products tend to assist their 
farmers more.
2 The middle line in Figure 8 is the estimated regression line, and the lower 
                                                 
2 The estimated regression equation used to generate Figure 8 without fixed effects is: 
RRA = 155 – 20.02lnYPC – 39.77NAE – 9.76(NAE)
2,    R
2 = 0.49,     no. of observations = 53  12
and upper lines trace the position for countries with one-tenth and ten times the global 
average per capita income, respectively. South Africa (ZAF) in that period sat about half 
way between the lower and middle lines (above Ethiopia (ETH) which is almost on the 
lower line, and to the left of AUS and NZL which are almost on the middle line). Does 
that suggest there could be domestic political pressures to raise the relative rate of 
assistance to South African farmers in the years ahead? 
Whether these past patterns for the world as a whole will continue into the future 
is a moot point. Those suggesting it may not cite the tariffication and tariff bindings in the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture as a reason to expect countries not to raise 
their agricultural assistance in the future. However, there is a great deal of ‘binding 
overhang’ in those WTO commitments for many countries. In the case of South Africa, 
that gap between bound and applied agricultural tariffs averages 32 percentage points, 
which is half as large again as that for Argentina and Chile (see Table 4). Sandrey, 
Karaan and Vink (2007) acknowledge this point, but argue that South Africa’s (or more 
accurately SACU’s) trade policy space is more constrained than that overhang suggests, 
not least because of preferential trade agreements with the EU, SADC and others. Thus 
only time will tell whether the South African government can resist political pressures 
from farm and agribusiness interest groups seeking higher agricultural assistance rates 
(that is, whether the country moves in a northwesterly direction in Figure 8 in the decades 
ahead) – and, if it does, whether more- (or less-) efficient forms of assistance than import 
restrictions are used in future.  
 
Lessons from other countries’ reforms 
 
What lessons can be drawn for South Africa from policy changes in the other 
Southern Hemisphere temperate countries? Argentina’s reversion back to export taxes 
was in response to a political crisis early this decade that hopefully no other countries 
replicate. Chile’s remarkable reforms that lowered protection in both agricultural and 
non-agricultural sectors to a uniform 6 percent tariff across-the-board, and which meant 
                                                                                                                                                   
where YPC is real per capita GDP, and NAE is net exports of agricultural and food products divided by the 
sum of gross exports and gross imports of agricultural and food products (so ranges between -1 and +1). All 
but the last of the four estimated coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.  13
its RRA rose from -20 percent in the 1960s and early 1970s to zero by the 1990s, has paid 
off handsomely – and not only in faster growth of GNP and agricultural exports. Foster 
and Valdes (2006) show that this growth has been a win also for the natural environment 
as the country has moved to less-pollutive agricultural activities and, even more 
remarkably, for poverty alleviation. The expectation was that poor, small maize and 
wheat farmers would miss out on the export-led boom in horticultural and wine 
production but, to the contrary, Foster and Valdes show they have benefited hugely, 
albeit indirectly: not only are those expanding farm activities more labour-intensive than 
traditional farm activities, but also they require much more post-farmgate activities than 
traditional bulk commodities. The associated processing, packing and transporting of 
these products to the seaport or airport have created many new off-farm and part-time 
wage earning opportunities for low-skilled farm families, ensuring their real incomes 
have risen as well. 
The experiences of Australia and New Zealand also are revealing. Their 
experimentation with direct farm subsidies in earlier decades as a way of partly offsetting 
high manufacturing protection did little to bolster the farm sector. That was because the 
subsidies tended to favour some of the least-competitive farm industries. Following much 
debate about the efficacy of that approach versus the simpler, more economically rational 
approach of dismantling both types of interventions,
3 successive governments during the 
1980s and 1990s adopted the latter strategy. The consequences of the gradual removal of 
the anti-agricultural and anti-trade biases in both countries (see Table 7) was a significant 
boost to both GDP growth in general and agricultural productivity growth in particular 
(see Figure 7). In Australia’s case, productivity growth was helped by the creation in the 
late 1980s of rural R&D corporations to manage research investments, funded by a levy 
on farmers matched dollar for dollar by a grant from the Federal Government. Introduced 
in 1989, this innovative funding model (together with a similar model for the generic 
promotion of Australia’s farm products) arguably has contributed significantly to the 
                                                 
3 A policy debate followed a famously unpublished 1968 paper by Gruen, with some arguing for tariff-
compensating farm assistance to continue until manufacturing tariffs were brought down (e.g., Harris et al. 
1974, Harris 1975) while others (e.g., Lloyd 1975, Warr 1978) pointed out the political economy dilemmas 
and administrative problems this could raise.  14
increased international competitiveness of Australian agriculture (see CIE 2003, 
Productivity Commission 2007, pp. 428-38). 
If South Africa wanted to assist its farmers more, these experiences suggest the 
best ways may be not though direct price support instruments but rather through reducing 
protection to non-agricultural sectors, reducing productivity-dampening regulations such 
as in marketing of farm products (see Karaan 2007), and boosting investments in rural 
R&D,
4 education and health where the social rates of returns are still well above private 
rates. 
                                                 
4 The comparative data presented by Pardey (2007) suggest South Africa could double its spending on 
agricultural R&D before it reached the same proportional investment as Australia.  15
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Table 1: Pertinent indicators of South African and other economies, 2000-04 












Argentina 4.3 0.9 5.4 
Australia 28.6 4.2 2.8 
Chile 1.2 0.9 3.9 
New Zealand  5.4 3.1 6.7 




Brazil 0.4 0.5 0.5 
China 0.5 0.2 0.6 
India 0.2 0.1 1.4 
Russia 1.9 0.5 0.5 
 
Northern Hemisphere  
temperate-zone countries 
 
Western Europe  0.5 4.5 1.1 
United States  1.8 6.6 1.1 
Canada 2.7 4.5 1.4 






Source: from the data compilation by Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2006).  20
Table 2: Agricultural share of GDP, employment and exports, Southern Hemisphere 
temperate-zone countries, 1950 to 2004 
(percent, at current prices) 
 
GDP share   Argentina Australia  Chile  New  Zealand  South  Africa 
1950-54   22       
1960-64   16    14   
1970-74 11  9  7  12  7 
1990-94 6  3  9  10  4 
2000-04 7  3  4  9  3 
 
Employment  Argentina Australia  Chile  New  Zealand  South  Africa 
1960-64 19  10  29  14  36 
1980-84 13  6  20  11  17 
2000-04 9  4  15  9  9 
 
Export share  Argentina Australia  Chile  New  Zealand  South  Africa
a 
1950-51    86     
1960-64 93  78  9  83   
1970-74 79  51  9  70  35 
1980-84 73  40  28  58  9 
1990-94 60  31  36  50  8 
2000-04 48  25  34  44  8 
 
a From 1980 gold is included in South Africa’s officially reported export data used here 
(from SA Customs and Excise), lowering the agricultural share 2-4 percentage points 
below the numbers reported in Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2006) which are based 
on World Bank (2006) data. 
 
Source: From the data compilation by Sandri, Valenzuela and Anderson (2006). 
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Table 3: Agricultural exports as a share of primary agricultural production,
a Southern 
Hemisphere temperate-zone countries, 1961 to 2004 
(percent) 
 





1960s 42  46 1 40  11
1970s 34  44 8 45  15
1980s 37  55 34 61  11
1990s 36  56 41 66  9
2001-04 36  55 67 64  11
 
a Primary production at the farm gate is valued at undistorted prices of each product, so as to be 
consistent with the fob prices of exports. However, since exports are sometimes only possible in 
processed form, their value is inflated by the cost of not only internal trade but also processing. 
Insofar as countries are increasingly adding value post-farmgate, in part to differentiate their 
product more, this share is an indicator of both greater value added as well as greater export 
orientation. We are grateful to Yulia Mironova for help in preparing these estimates. 
 
b These percentages for South Africa are close to the share of just unprocessed agricultural 
exports, according to official data from SA Customs and Excise. If processed food is added, 
those shares roughly double but are still much less than those for the other four countries shown. 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on FAO export value data and country authors’ value of 
production data   22
Table 4: Import tariffs, Southern Hemisphere temperate-zone countries, 2006 
(percent) 
 
  Argentina Australia Chile New  Zealand South  Africa
Simple average applied (bound)
a tariff:   
      Agriculture  10(33) 1  (3)  6(26) 2  (6) 9(41)
      Non-agriculture  13(32) 4(11)  6(25) 3(10) 8(16)
Share of MFN applied tariffs <6%
b   
      Agriculture  14 99  100 83 56
      Non-agriculture  29 85  100 67 64
Average MFN applied tariffs   
      Cereals  12 3  6 4 10
      Oilseeds  8 3  6 1 8
      Sugar  18 10  6 2 5
      Cotton  6 1  6 0 6
      Fruit and veg.  10 4  6 1 9
      Coffee and tea  13 4  6 3 9
      Meat products  9 2  6 2 13
      Dairy products  15 5  6 2 23
   
   
 
a The WTO-bound tariff is shown in parentheses. 
 
b Less than or equal to 5 percent, except for Chile where it refers to 6 percent 
 
Sources: WTO, ITC and UNCTAD (2007).   23
Table 5: Nominal rates of assistance to selected agricultural industries, South Africa, 1960 to 2005 
(percent) 
Crop  1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
           
Exportables           
Sugar 
a  32.5 43.3  -15.3  3.4 49.5 39.0 78.9 35.9 41.8 
Apples 
a  -6.1 -4.1  2.3  -10.6  -17.3 12.9  9.0 -7.3  0.4 
Oranges  -7.3 -17.9 -40.3 -28.3 -15.5 -18.2  -4.4  2.9  11.4 
Table  Grapes    -20.6  -20.6 2.8 0.2  -33.1  23.6 5.5 8.8 8.3 
           
Importables           
Beef 
a  7.3 16.4  4.2 34.6 52.2  0.9  -12.5 -0.6 -9.9 
Mutton  13.6 13.6 40.1 39.0 28.3 32.4 33.1 23.4  3.7 
Poultry  -12.9  -12.9  -15.7  -23.8 18.4 -2.9  6.5 12.9  2.7 
           
Nontradables           
Apples 
a  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.6  -2.8  -6.0  -2.3 0.0 0.0 
Oranges 
a  0.0 0.0 0.0  -1.0  -3.5  -6.2  -1.0 0.0 0.0 
Grapes 
a  0.0 0.0 0.0  -0.6  -2.8  -6.0  -2.3 0.0 0.0 
           
Mixed Trade Status           
Wheat  7.3 11.6 25.7 61.1 67.4 65.8 13.4 -0.1  9.3 
Yellow  Maize  4.9 19.0  4.6 13.7 39.2 86.3 56.0 12.7 10.4 
White  Maize  -46.1 -39.3 -52.4 -48.6 -31.6 -21.7 -16.7 -19.6 -23.4 
Sunflower 
a  18.9  17.7 6.2 7.2  19.9 7.4 6.9  -6.9  -3.6 
           
Total of covered products  -8.0  -0.9  -12.5  -5.2  21.4  9.7  4.5  3.7  -1.5 
Standard deviation.of covered products 
b    19.8 21.9 29.8 34.7 42.1 37.5 33.2 19.4 22.6 
%  coverage  (at  undistorted  prices)  70.2 69.1 71.1 69.7 65.5 66.8 68.6 67.9 69.7 
a Values in 1960-64 column are for 1961-64 for Beef, Sugar, Apples, Oranges, Grapes, Maize, Sunflower. 
b The standard deviation shown in the simple 5-year 
average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean. 
Source: Kirsten, Edwards and Vink (2007) 
  24
Table 6:  Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries (%), Southern Hemisphere temperate-zone countries, 1960 to 2005
a  
   1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
ARGENTINA           
Exportables  -29.2 -26.3 -27.9 -24.8 -22.6 -18.3  -8.3  -5.2 -17.1 
Import-competing  products           
Weighted average of covered products   -14.6  -13.2  -13.4  -11.7  -11.9  -8.1  -3.1  0.0  -13.3 
Standard  deviation  of  covered  products  7 19 15 17 14 11  7  9 13 
   % coverage (at undistorted prices)  68  61  47  51  62  67  68  69  69 
AUSTRALIA           
Exportables  7.0  10.0 7.6 3.6 4.6 5.6 4.8 3.0 0.0 
Import-competing  products  12.5 13.1 18.3 11.6  8.0  3.7  1.8  0.4  0.1 
Weighted  average  of  covered  products  8.5  12.3 8.8 4.6 5.4 5.7 4.4 2.6 0.0 
Standard  deviation  of  covered  products  23 39 56 29 19 13 11  6  0.4 
   % coverage (at undistorted prices)  86  87  85  85  86  76  83  80  78 
CHILE           
Exportables  10.8 21.9 35.2 -1.2 -2.0 -1.3 -0.6 -0.5 -0.3 
Import-competing  products  10.7  -8.2  -14.5 3.0 4.8  23.9  17.4  14.8 5.7 
Weighted average of covered products  10.6  -6.3  -10.6  2.5  4.2  20.6  13.7  11.2  5.7 
Standard  deviation  of  covered  products  88 33 37 46 37 38 34 32 29 
   % coverage (at undistorted prices)  58  48  47  46  37  38  34  32  29 
NEW ZEALAND           
Exportables  0.1  0.2  2.8 13.1 19.0 12.1  1.2  0.8  0.9 
Import-competing  products  28.3 28.8 32.0 27.1 31.6 44.4 28.6 24.4 24.9 
Weighted  average  of  covered  products  1.8  1.9  5.0 14.4 20.2 15.2  3.0  2.1  2.2 
Standard  deviation  of  covered  products  39 43 35 23 18 29 19 19 16 
   % coverage (at undistorted prices)  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
SOUTH AFRICA           
Exportables  5 8 6 9  28 0 0 4  -2 
Import-competing products  -17  -7 -25 -12  17  34  19  8  -1 
Weighted average of covered products  -8.0 -0.9  -12.5 -5.2 21.4  9.7  4.5  3.7 -1.5 
Standard deviation of covered products  20 22 30 35 42 38 33 19 23 
   % coverage (at undistorted prices)  70 69 71 70 66 67 69 68 70 
a Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production. The standard deviation is around the weighted mean. First period for South 
Africa is 1961-64 for some products. 
Sources: Sturzenegger and Salazni (2007), Anderson, Lattimore, Lloyd and MacLaren (2007), Valdes and Jara (2007), and Kirsten, Edwards and Vink (2007).  25
Table 7:  Relative rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Southern Hemisphere temperate-zone countries, 1960 to 2005  
(percent) 
   1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-05 
ARGENTINA           
    NRA,  all  agric.  tradables  -25.3 -22.7 -22.9 -20.5 -19.6 -15.7  -7.0  -4.0 -16.2 
  NRA, all non-ag tradables  61.4  52.3  35.1  21.1  17.7  15.8  11.0  10.5  5.3 
  Relative Rate of Assistance, RRA
a  -53.6 -49.2 -43.0 -34.2 -31.7 -27.2 -16.2 -13.1 -20.6 
    Trade  Bias  Index           
AUSTRALIA           
  NRA, all agric. tradables  8.4  10.9  8.9  4.9  5.2  5.1  4.5  3.0  0.5 
  NRA, all non-ag tradables  20.7  20.7  16.8  12.0  11.1  8.2  5.3  2.6  2.0 
  Relative Rate of Assistance, RRA
a  -10.2 -8.2 -6.8 -6.4 -5.3 -2.9 -0.7  0.4 -1.5 
    Trade  Bias  Index           
CHILE           
  NRA, all agric. tradables  11.8 3.1 3.5 1.9 6.1  13.6 8.1 7.4 3.0 
  NRA, all non-ag tradables  33.8 26.1 32.1 11.2  7.2  9.0  5.9  5.3  2.1 
  Relative Rate of Assistance, RRA
a  -16.1 -18.0 -20.0  -8.0  -1.0  4.2  2.2  2.0  0.9 
    Trade  Bias  Index           
NEW ZEALAND           
  NRA, all agric. tradables  1.8  1.9  5.0 14.4 20.2 15.2  3.0  2.1  2.2 
  NRA, all non-ag tradables  24.0 34.3 30.0 21.7 20.3 16.6 10.8  6.5  3.7 
  Relative Rate of Assistance, RRA
a  -17.8  -24.1  -19.0 -6.0 -0.1 -1.3 -7.1 -4.1 -1.5 
    Trade  Bias  Index           
SOUTH AFRICA
a           
  NRA, all agric. tradables  -1  2  -10 -4 22 12 10  4 -2 
  NRA, all non-ag tradables  2 2 2 1 6 6 8 6 4 
  Relative Rate of Assistance, RRA
a  -8  0 12 -5 16  6  1 -1 -5 
  Trade Bias Index  -18 -13 -28 -17  -9  31  18  3  4 
a First period for South Africa is 1961-64. The Relative Rate of Assistance, RRA = 100[(1+NRAag
t/100)/(1+NRAnonag
t/100) - 1], where NRAag
t and 
NRAnonag
t are the average percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively. The Trade Bias Index, TBI = 
100[(1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1] where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the import-competing and exportable parts of the 
agricultural sector. 
Sources: Sturzenegger and Salazni (2007), Anderson, Lattimore, Lloyd and MacLaren (2007), Valdes and Jara (2007), and Kirsten, Edwards and Vink (2007).  26
Figure 1: Customs revenue as a share of merchandise imports, Southern Hemisphere temperate-
zone countries,
a 1870 to 1996 
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Sources: Authors’ compilation based on data from Mitchell (2003a,b,c), Maloney (2002), World 
Bank (2006). 
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Figure 2: Merchandise exports plus imports as a share of GDP, Southern Hemisphere temperate-zone countries,



























































































Sources: Authors’ compilation based on data from Mitchell (2003a,b,c).  28
Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Southern Hemisphere temperate-zone countries, 1955 to 2005(percent) 
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Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries (%), Northern Hemisphere 
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Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries (%), Africa (excluding South Africa), Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC), and the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia (ECA), 1955 to 2004  
























1955-59 1965-69 1975-79 1985-89 1995-99
Africa Asia ECA LAC 31
Figure 5 (continued): Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural industries (%), Africa (excluding South Africa), Asia, Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC), and the transition economies of Europe and Central Asia (ECA), 1955 to 2004  
(b) simple averages (percent) 
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Figure 6:  Relative rates of assistance to agricultural industries, Southern Hemisphere temperate-zone countries, 1955 to 2005(percent) 
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Figure 7: Real agricultural total/multi-factor productivity growth, Australia and New 
Zealand, 1927 to 2004 
 









































































































Sources:  Anderson, Lattimore, Lloyd and MacLaren (2007).   34
Figure 8: Multiple regression of RRA on per capita income and agricultural comparative 
advantage, 2000-04 
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